WHO IS AN "OFFICER" UNDER SECTION 16(b)-

WHO KNOWS?

INTRODUCTIOiN

The purpose of this article is to explore the spreading confusion
and tests that are proliferating from the federal courts in their
quest to resolve the dilemma of "who is an officer?" under section
16(b) of the 1934 Securities Exchange Act.'
It would seem to be a relatively simple matter to define "officer"
for the purposes of 16(b), but there are many perplexing questions
involved. Consider the status of an assistant treasurer, secretary,
or comptroller; the officer of a division of the parent company; the
president of a subsidiary; an executive who holds the title of vicepresident but has no duties comparable to the title of his office;
1. 15 U.S.C. § 78p(b) (1970). Section 16(b) reads as follows:
For the purpose of preventing the unfair use of information which
may have been obtained by such beneficial owner, director or officer by reason of his relationship to the issuer, any profit realized
by him from any purchase and sale, or any sale and purchase, of
any equity security of such issuer (other than an exempted security) within any period of less than six months, unless such security was acquired in good faith in connection with a debt previously
contracted, shall inure to and be recoverable by the issuer, irrespective of any intention on the part of such benecfiial owner, director,
or officer in entering into such transaction of holding the security
purchased or of not repurchasing the security sold for a period of
exceeding six months. Suit to recover such profit may be instituted
at law or in equity in any court of competent jurisdiction by the
issuer, or by the owner of any security of the issuer in the name
and in behalf of the issuer if the issuer shall fail or refuse to bring
such suit within sixty days after request or shall fail diligently to
prosecute the same thereafter; but no such suit shall be brought
more than two years after the date such profit was realized. This
subsection shall not be construed to cover any transaction where
such beneficial owner was not such both at the time of the purchase
and sale, or the sale and purchase, of the security involved, or any
transaction or transactions which the Commission by rules and regulations may exempt as not comprehended within the purpose of
this subsection.
Although section 16 (b) regulates other corporate groups besides officers,
the limitation on the length of this article limits the coverage of 16 (b) to
officers alone. Nor is it possible to make any comparisons to 10b-5. For
the legislative history of 16 (b) see H.R. REP. Nos. 1383, 1838, 73d Cong., 2d
Sess. (1934); S. REP. Nos. 792, 1455, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. (1934) [Section 16(b)
will be cited hereinafter as 16 (b) ].
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or the employee who is not an officer under the by-laws but per-

forms important executive functions. Are these corporate employees to be treated as "officers" within the scope of 16(b)? Are the
courts doing the public a service or disservice in interpreting the
term "officer" in a restrictive fashion? Does the 1934 Act's attempt
to eliminate unfair insider trading by officers mean that 16(b) is
to be given an expansive reading? The potential issues and ramifications are virtually unlimited. Ultimately, the matter will have
to be resolved either by Congress or by the Supreme Court-or perhaps by both.
AN OvF EVIw OF SECTION 16
The underlying purpose of section 16 is to prevent certain insiders from unfairly using information to make a profit in the purchase
and sale or sale and purchase of the stock of the company. "Insiders" under this section include: directors, officers, or ten percent
owners of the equity security of the issuer which is registered under
section 122 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934.3
Generally, section 16 represents an attack upon possible abuses
of inside information by corporate insiders. 4 Section 16(a) 5 requires the reporting by certain insiders of their stockholdings and
transactions in the company's securities. 6 The reports filed pursu2. 15 U.S.C. § 781 (1970).
3. 11A E. GADSBY, BusINEss ORGANIZATION: FEDERAL SEcuRiTIEs ExCHANGE ACT OF 1934, at § 8.01 (7th ed. 1974) [hereinafter cited as GADSBY].
4. Prior to the enactment of 16(b) under the 1934 Act, Congressional
hearings revealed startling abuses of inside information by many prominent
members of the financial community, who apparently believed that these
sure-thing profits came with their offices. Thus, 16 (b) was introduced "to
protect the interests of the public against the predatory operation of directors, officers, and principal stockholders of corporations by preventing them
from speculating in the stock of the corporation they owe a fiduciary duty."
S. REP. No. 1455, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 68 (1934).
"A renewal of investors'
confidence in the exchange markets can be effected only by a clearer recognition, upon the part of officers of companies whose securities are publicly
held, of their responsibilities as trustees for their corporations. Men
charged with the administration of other people's money must not use inside
information for their own advantage." H.R. REP. No. 1383, 73d Cong., 2d
Sess. (1934). Thus, a corporate officer who realizes short-swing profits in
dealing with his company's stock cannot argue that he did not use inside information in an attempt to escape 16 (b) liability. Petteys v. Butler, 367 F.2d
528, 532 (8th Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 1006 (1967).
5. 15 U.S.C. § 78p (a) (1970) [hereinafter cited as 16(a) ].

6. 16(a) reads as follows:
Every person who is directly or indirectly the beneficial owner of

ant to 16(a) are matters of public information and are published
7
by the SEC on a monthly basis.
Under 16(a), as amended in 1964, every officer of a corporation
which is registered under section 12 must file reports as to his stockholdings and any changes in such holdings.8 The goal of this
provision is to ensure complete publicity as to the stock interest
of the executive holding a position of control in a corporation.9
The purpose of 16(b) is to permit the corporation or a security
holder to bring an action on the corporation's behalf to recover
short-swing profits realized by insiders within any six-month
period.10
Sections 16(a) and 16(b) are necessarily interrelated. Generally, if one is subject to the reporting requirements of 16(a), one
is also subject to the short-swing profit limitations of 16(b).11 Litmore than 10 per centum of any class of any equity security (other
than an exempted security) which is registered pursuant to Section
12 of this title, or who is a director or an officer of the issuer of
such security, shall file, at the time of the registration of such security on a national securities exchange or by the effective date of
a registration statement filed pursuant to Section 12 (g) of this title,
or within ten days after he becomes such beneficial owner, director,
or officer, a statement with the Commission (and, if such security
is registered on a national securities exchange, also with the exchange) of the amount of all equity securities of such issuer of
whichhe is the beneficial owner, and within ten days after the
close of each calendar month thereafter, if there has been a change
in such ownership during such month, shall file with the Commission (and if such security is registered on a national securities exchange, shall also file with the exchange) a statement indicating
his ownership at the close of the calendar month and such changes
in his ownership as have occurred during such calendar month.
7. SEC, OFrcIAI SUMMAnRY OF SEcURIT TRANSACTIONS ANn HoLDmras
OFFICERS, Dnm-roRs Aim PRINCIPAL STocimoLERs.

OF

This summary can be

obtained from the Government Printing Office in Washington.
8. The rules of the Commission require that the initial statement of
ownership by an officer be filed on Form 3 and that monthly statements
of changes of ownership be filed on Form 4. These forms are printed and
supplied by the SEC with detailed instructions. Form 4 requires that the
"exact date" of the change be recorded and statements are not deemed filed
until "actually received by the Commission or exchange." Forms 3 and 4
are available at any SEC office. Failure to file the forms required by 16 (a)
enables the SEC to seek injunctive relief. See note 32, infra.
9. "Because it is difficult to draw a clear line as a matter of law between truly inside information and information generally known by the better-informed investors, the most potent weapon against abuse of inside information is full and prompt publicity. For this reason, this bill requires
the disclosure of the corporate holdings of officers . . . and prompt disclo-

sure of any changes that occur in their corporate holdings." H.R. REP. No.
1383, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. (1934).
10. 15 U.S.C. § 78p(b) (1970).
11. Feder v. Martin Marietta Corp., 406 F.2d 260, 268 (2d Cir. 1969).
Rule 16a-10 provides that any transaction exempted by the SEC from the
provisions of 16(a) shall be likewise exempted from 16(b). However, the
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igation under 16(a) and 16(b) usually occurs in unanticipated
situations. Consequently, section 16 transactions that are litigated
generally will involve a reorganization, merger or an option situation. An officer of a company which has equity security registered
under section 12 should be cognizant of section 16 and of incurring
12
short-swing profits.
In order for 16(b) to have any effect, the issuer's stock in which
the defendant officer deals must be an equity security under section
12 of the Act. 13 While the cases discussed generally involve corporate equity securities, 16(b) is applicable to equity securities registered under section 12 of unincorporated business organizations
as well.1 4 Exempted securities are narrowly limited under the Act
to governmental securities and very few others.' 5 Even if the
corporation has only registered a class of common stock, all other
equity securities of the issuer are subject to 16(b). The Act and
rules adopted thereunder broadly define equity securities to include,
among others, debt securities convertible into equity securities.',
Thus, any officer of a moderately sized or larger company can rest
assured that if he involves himself in short-swing transactions,
he is within the scope of 16(b).

THE EARLY CASES AND ColvnMISSION GuIDELINES-AN

UNCERTAIN BEGINNING

Under the 1934 Act, 16(b) is applicable to "every person who is
In spite of this
."
...an officer of the issuer of such security ...
seemingly specific enumeration of the persons who are subject to
Second Circuit has held that the rule is invalid to the extent it exempts
16(b) transactions "comprehended within the purpose" of 16(b). Id. at
267-69. Also note there are a limited number of situations in which one
is no longer subject to the reporting requirements of 16(a) but continues
to be subject to the provisions of l(b). See 3A H. BLOOMENTHAL, SEcuunms Am FEDERAL ComuoRmAT LAW § 10.04[2] nn.44-49 (2d ed. 1974) for an
excellent summary of these exceptions to the 16(a)-16(b) relationship
[hereinafter cited as BLOOMZNTHAL].
12. GADSBY, supra note 3, at § 8.01.

13. 15 U.S.C. § 78p (b) (1970).
14. BLOOMENTHML, supra note 12, at 10.03; see also §§ 3.03, 3.09.
15. 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a) (12) (1970) gives the SEC general power to exempt. 15 U.S.C. § 78w(a) (1970) gives the Commission a general grant of
authority to make rules and regulations necessary to the execution of the
Act.
16. 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a) (11) (1970).

this section, there has been considerable controversy over the scope
of the coverage. 17
The 1934 Securities Exchange Act gave a clear definition of the
term "director."' Is Strangely, in creating 16(b) Congress never
provided a definition of who is an officer. Because of this lack
of guidelines the Commission, pursuant to its rule-making power
under the Act, responded with rule 3b-2, which reads:
The term "officer" means a president, vice-president, treasurer,
secretary, comptroller, and any other person who performs for an
issuer, whether incorporated or unincorporated, functions corresponding to those performed by the foregoing officers. 19

Although the rule narrowed the scope of 16 (b) officers, there
still remained many troublesome problems. One of these was the
status of an assistant secretary or assistant treasurer who 'held a
position of substantial importance but was not named in rule 3b2. The General Counsel for the Commission attempted to resolve
this matter in a 1940 release which provided:
[An assistant would be an "officer" if his chief is so inactive that
the assistant is really performing his chief's functions. However,
an assistant, although performing some functions which might be
those of his chief, would not be an "officer" so long as these duties
were under the supervision of his chief. Temporary absence or
brief vacation of an officer during which an assistant performs the
officer's duties would not constitute the assistant an "officer." Subject to the foregoing, assistant treasurers, assistant secretaries, and
assistant comptrollers, for example, are 20not to be considered
"officers" for the purposes of this definition.
Thus, if an assistant treasurer performs all or a substantial
amount of the duties of the treasurer, the assistant should be con-

sidered an officer within the purview of section 16. On the other
hand, the Commission would not consider one an officer who
performed none of the functions of the treasurer, or who performed

21
some of such functions under the supervision of the treasurer.
Even with the promulgation of rule 3b-2 and the General Coun-

sel's ruling, it remained unclear what caused the corporate em17. Cook & Feldman, Insider Trading Under the Securities Exchange
Act, 66 HAav. L. Rsv. 385, 397 (1953). This two part article by the SEC's
Chairman and Special Counsel, although now more than 20 years old, is

still highly informative and useful in understanding the basics of 16(b) of
the 1934 Act [hereinafter cited as Cook & Feldman].
18. Section 3(a) (7) defines a director as: "[A]ny director of a corporation or any person performing similar functions with respect to any organization, whether incorporated or unincorporated." 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a) (7)
(1970).
19. 17 C.F.R. § 240.3b-2 (1949).

20. SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 2687 (1940).

21. Comment, Current Problems Under Section 16 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 44 MARQ. L. REv. 59, 60-61 (1960).
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ployee to be treated as an "officer" for the purposes of section 16.
There appeared to be two tests upon which liability was predicated:
(1) the employee's holding of an enumerated position, or (2) the
degree of administrative responsibility shouldered by the employee. 22 The case of Colby v. Klune2 3 attempted to resolve this
uncertainty.
Colby involved a production manager of Twentieth Century Film
Corporation who allegedly made a profit as a result of short-swing
trading in the company stock. A stockholder brought an action on
behalf of the corporation to recover the profits realized by the
defendant. The production manager was granted a summary
judgment by the district court, on the ground that he was not an
officer of the corporation and therefore was not subject to any liabilities under 16(b) .24 The district court, in ruling in the defendant's favor, had focused primarily on the Commission's 3b-2 rule.
It determined that the production manager clearly was not one of
the officers specifically enumerated in 3b-2, nor was he performing
25
the duties in place of one of these officers.
On appeal to the Second Circuit, the Commission in an amicus
curiae brief attempted to further clarify its 16(b) officer position
found in 3b-2 and the General Counsel's opinion. Essentially, the
Commission felt that in each case the function performed should
be analyzed to determine whether the person was one who had some
responsibility for the policy of a substantial segment of the corporate affairs and who participated in executive councils of the
26
corporation.
However, the Second Circuit in reversing expressed doubts even
in the validity of 3b-2. 27 Judge Frank, in writing the court's opinion, instead chose an altogether new test to be utilized in determining who is an "officer" under 16 (b). His test has a subjective
tinge in place of the rather objective bent of the Commission's rule
3b-2.
22. Cook &Feldman, supra note 17, at 398.
23. 178 F.2d 872 (2d Cir. 1949).
24. Colby v. Klune, 83 F. Supp. 159 (S.D.N.Y. 1949).

25. Id. at 161.
26. 178 F.2d at 875.
"Assuming for the moment that Rule X-3b-2, issued by
As we think that, at this
....
stage of the case, it is well to reserve decision concerning the statutory
power of the S.E.C. to issue Rule X-3b-2 .... "
27. Id. at 873:

the S.E.C., is not authorized by the statute

[W]e construe "officer" as ... inter alia, a corporate employee
performing important executive duties of such character that he
would be likely, in discharging these duties, to obtain confidential
information about the company's affairs that would aid him if he
engaged in personal market transactions. It is immaterial how his
functions are labeled or how defined by the by-laws, or that he
does or does
28 not act under the supervision of some corporate representative.

As for the General Counsel's release of 1940, interpreting the
status of highly placed corporate "assistants" and "managers," the
Colby court expressly rejected it. 20
Thus, the Second Circuit seems to have ignored the SEC's proposals and instead focused on whether the "corporate employee
performing important executive duties . . . would be likely . . . to

obtain confidential information about the company's affairs. . ... 30
Under such a definition it is immaterial how the employee's functions are labeled or how the by-laws define them. Apparently, the
Colby court favored a broader officer test as being more consistent
with the spirit of section 16, since the possibility of obtaining and
unfairly using inside information was not limited to the select few
who fell within the Commission's 3b-2 definition.
Because of the Second Circuit's indifference to previous SEC interpretations of "officer," the Commission sought to amend its
definition to more resemble the Colby definition.8 1 To get the feelings of the business community, the Commission solicited comments
from corporate personnel on the proposed change. The response
was overwhelmingly negative. Corporate management was alarmed at the expansiveness of the Colby decision which appeared
to them to radically enlarge the area of potential liability. They
felt that the subjective test of Colby would necessitate much additional proof in each case, and make the position of the quasi-officer
very uncertain.3 2 In view of this reaction and in view of the
uncertainty of the Colby court's definition, the Commission decided
not to adopt the proposal but to await further expression of the
court's view.33

The SEC did not have long to wait after its decision not to adopt
28. Id.
29. Id. at 875 n.15: "...
that 'release' also sets forth 'the opinion of
the General Counsel of the Commission' as to the meaning of 'officer' under
Rule X-3b-2. As this 'opinion' of the General Counsel is not part of the
'Commission's formal action,' it does not bind the Commission and certainly

not the courts. Since we disagree with it, we disregard it."
30. Id. at 873.
31. 20 U.S.L.W. 2613 (June 24, 1952); see also 106 F. Supp. 810, 814 (SD.
Cal. 1952).
32. Comment, supra note 21, at 63.
33. Cook & Feldman, supra note 17, at 399.
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the Colby definition. In 1952, the Southern District Court of
California offered the first judicial guidance on the 16(b) officer
dilemma since the Colby decision some three years earlier.
Lockheed Aircraft Corp. v. Rathman"4 was an action brought by
the company under 16(b). Lockheed sought to recover profits realized by its assistant treasurer in buying and selling Lockheed stock
under an employee option plan within a six-month time period.
The option plan had been set up for the benefit of valuable corporate employees other than the president, vice-president, treasurer, secretary, and comptroller. Top executives were excluded
because of the corporation's recognition of the applicability of 16(b)
to those persons. Thus, the question presented to the court was
whether the assistant treasurer was an "officer" whose transactions
fell within the scope of 16(b).3 5

The district court accepted the definition of "officer" found in
3b-2.36 It interpreted the SEC's 3b-2 definition of "officer" as relating only to the specific officers named, and to persons in establishments other than corporations who performed duties identical with
those of the officers named, but under different titles.37 In the instant case, the court noted that the functions of the assistant treasurer's office did not correspond to those performed by the treasurer.
The judge went on to hold:
The evidence... established that plaintiff corporation, during de-

fendant's tenure as assistant treasurer, was possessed of a full time
and fully capable treasurer... who preempted the executive funcof defendant's performing any
tions of that office to the exclusion
of the functions of treasurer.38
Of particular significance is that the district court in Rathman
construed the decision in Colby as a condemnation of "trial by affi34. 106 F. Supp. 810 (S.D. Cal. 1952).
35. Annot., 40 A.L.R.2d 1360; A.L.R. provides a good summary of the
early 16(b) officer cases.
36. 106 F. Supp. at 812: "The Commission in carrying out the power
granted by Congress to define 'technical trade, and accounting terms' 15
U.S.C.A. § 78c(b), intended its definition of the term 'officer' to be analogous to the Congressional definition . .. ." Thus, the court specifically rejected that portion of the opinion in Colby v. Klune which cast doubt
upon the validity of rule 3b-2.
37. Id. at 813.
38. Id. Although the court never mentioned SEC Release 2687 (supra
note 20) it is interesting to note the similarity between present quotes and
the release. It seems that Lockheed v. Rathman approved of both 3b-2 and
the General Counsel's opinion.

davit,"3 9 rather than as a definitive expression of its views on who
is an "officer" as used in section 16. Under the Rathman court's
analysis, the Commission rule could be reinstated as the sole guide
to the definition of "officer." Furthermore, many of the problems
raised by the broad language of Colby could be avoided by considering it applicable only to the facts of that case.
The final matter to be considered by the Rathman court was the
defendant's reliance on the SEC's previous assurance that he was
not an officer for section 16 purposes. After the defendant was
elected assistant treasurer, the corporation had inquired of the
Commission as to whether or not he was an officer under section
16(a). The SEC answered this question in the negative and the
defendant then exercised his option. Thus, the odd result of this
case was that the company was suing to recover compensation it
had intended to give to the defendant after it had encouraged him
to exercise his option. The court held that even if it were to assume
that the defendant was an officer of Lockheed, it could nevertheless
find no liability because of the defendant's good faith reliance on
the SEC ruling, which gave him exempt status under section 23 (a)
of the Securities Exchange Act. 40
The case of Lockheed v. Campbell 41 immediately followed the
Rathman decision. The question that was presented in that case
was whether an employee who was both an assistant treasurer and
assistant secretary was liable to the corporation for short-swing
profits realized in trading the corporation's stock.
A different judge of the same district court which decided
Rathman refused to adopt either the subjective test of Colby or
the objective test of 3b-2 utilized by the Rathman court. The court
felt that Colby went too far in holding that it was immaterial under
16(b) how the alleged officer's functions were labeled or whether
he acted under the supervision of some other corporate representative. However, the judge felt that Rathman's heavy reliance on
3b-2 was perhaps too limited a viewpoint. Thus, the judge sought
out a middle of the road position. He ruled:
I think the question which confronts us here can be solved without
adopting either view in its entirety. [lit is conceivable that in a
corporation like Lockheed, with complex activities, two persons

might perform the functions of treasurer, secretary and comptroller,
39. Id.

40. 15 U.S.C. § 78w(a) (1970) provides: "[N]o provision of this chapter
imposing any liability shall apply to any act done or omitted in good faith

in conformity with any rule or regulation of the Commission or the Board
of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, notwithstanding that such rule
or regulation may, after such act or omission, be amended or rescinded or
be determined by judicial or other authority to be invalid for any reason."
41. 110 F. Supp. 282 (S.D. Cal. 1953).
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each doing, within a certain sphere of the corporation's far-flung
activities, exactly the same things. 42

The court therefore inquired into the actual responsibilities of
the defendant's job, and finding that he had no concern with questions of 43
policy, held him not to be an officer within the meaning
of 16 (b).

As a result of Rathman and Campbell, the status of the Commission's rule 3b-2 was settled. 44 The legal commentary 4 5 that followed these decisons generally applauded Rathman and Campbell
as being the only practical approach to the section 16 officer issue
These articles found Colby's "confidential information" test largely
unworkable because of the necessity of having additional proof to
show how the "employee . . . obtain[ed] confidential information"

and the seemingly unlimited class of potential violators.
Yet Colby seems to have been more than one circuit's unusual
interpretation of unusual facts. The SEC recognized this in a 1952
release that cautioned the business community. The Commission
warned that the courts might declare provisions of the Act applicable to certain officers in order to reach a broader class than might
otherwise appear from the definition contained in the Securities
Exchange Act rule 3b-2. 4 6
RECENT CASES-RECENT CoNFusIoN

Apparently, the California district court's decision in Campbell,
taking a middle of the road position in defining section 16 officers,
was successful, or at least it was for fifteen years. The 1968
case of Lee National Corporation v. Segur47 presented an entirely new problem involving the status of a highly placed employee who clearly appeared to be an "officer" under any test-'
Colby, Rathman, Campbell, or 3b-2. The complicating factor was
42. Id. at 284.
43. Id. at 285. Support for this holding was found in the testimony of
the employee's superior that the employee was primarily engaged in the
supervision of the mechanics of the persons working in the finance department of the corporation and that he was essentially an"administrator who
never performed the functions of his superiors.
44. 106 F. Supp. at 813; 110 F. Supp. at 286.
45. See Cook & Feldman, supra note 17, at 400; Cole, Insiders' Liabilities under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 12 SouTWESTE
L.J. 147,
159 (1958); Comment, supra note 21, at 63.

46. SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 4754, at 2 (1952).
47. 281 F. Supp. 851 (E.D. Pa. 1968).

that this important executive was not an officer of the suing corporation but rather an officer of the subsidiary of the company.
There was no question that he had indeed bought and sold stock
of the parent corporation within a six-month time period. Thus,
the sole issue before the District Court of Eastern Pennsylvania
was whether an officer of a subsidiary who deals in the parent company's stock within a six-month period has violated section 16.
In ruling in the defendant's favor, the court held:
Section 16 (b) limits its application to the 'officer' of the 'issuer' and
section 16 (a) is likewise limited to 'officer of the issuer' of such security. Regulation 240.3b-2 ... defines the term 'officer' as meaning a president, vice-president, treasurer, secretary, comptroller, and
any other person who performs certain functions 'for an issuer.'48

The plaintiff's counsel conceded that the company was merely
seeking a judicial determination to the effect that while the language of 3b-2 expressly refers to an "officer of the issuer," it also
extended to an officer of a subsidiary corporation. The company's
attorney further admitted that the officer had not been employed
by the subsidiary to avoid the purposes of section 16. 4 9 The court
used emphatic language in rejecting the judicial broadening of the
definition of "officer" sought by the plaintiff. The court ruled:
While the purpose of the Act is to recover 'short swing profits'
realized by so-caled 'insiders,' the fact is that if it be of the congressional intent to include officers of subsidiary corporations as well
as officers of the 'issuer' corporation, this can be quickly accomplished by a simple amendment to the Act. It need not be accomplishment by ... 'judicial legislation.' [P]laintiff seeks a 0construction of the statute not heretofore granted by any Court.6

After listening to oral argument and reviewing briefs, the Pennsylvania district court granted defendant's motion to dismiss plaintiff's complaint. 5' The court felt that in light of the present
language of 3b-2, the parent corporation's allegation of a 16(b) violation by the subsidiary's officer was without merit.
The year 1973 brought with it several significant 16(b) officer
cases. Two of the cases were handled by the Southern District
Court of New York, 52 and the remaining case was heard by the
48. Id. at 851-52.
49. Id. at 852: "Fraud is not alleged and plaintiff's counsel frankly concedes that it is not involved. Neither does he contend that defendant's employment as an officer with a subsidiary corporation was in any way a subterfuge."

50. Id.

51. Id.
52. Schimmel v. Goldman, 57 F.R.D. 481 (S.D.N.Y. 1973) and Morales v.
Holiday Inns, 366 F. Supp. 760 (S.D.N.Y. 1973) It is important to note that
both of these cases are from the same circuit which rendered the Colby deci-

sion.
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Eastern District Court of Pennsylvania. 53 These three cases are
similar on one key issue-can a corporate employee who holds the
title of vice-president still escape the burdens of 16(b) officer
status? Unlike the Lee National Corporation v. Segur case, these
executives were all vice-presidents of the parent company and not
a subsidiary. Thus, for the first time the courts were faced with
a 16(b) officer issue involving a corporate executive who was not
a production manager, 54 assistant treasurer,55 assistant secretary,5 6
or officer of a subsidiary. 57 As would be expected, the results of
the three cases are varied.
The first of the 1973 cases was Schimmel v. Goldman.58 The
defendant was a vice-president of a company whose stock he sold
and bought within a six-month period. The plaintiff brought a
shareholder's derivative suit, alleging that Goldman had violated
16(b) and therefore must turn over to the corporation any profits
realized. 9 As a result of the plaintiff's suit, the corporation and
the defendant entered into a compromise settlement under which
the defendant paid $60,000, or 72% of his profit, to the company.
Although no shareholders objected to the agreement, the SEC
submitted an amicus curiae memorandum challenging the settlement on the grounds that "the defenses set forth in the moving
papers... are too weak to justify the substantial discount at which
... [the] claim is proposed to be settled."60 Apparently the Commission felt that Goldman's defense that he was not an officer for
16 (b) purposes was so frivolous that no compromise was justified.
Thus, the issue before the court was whether a vice-president's de53. Selas Corporation of America v. Voogd, 365 F. Supp. 1268 (E.D. Pa.
1973). Although a different judge sat on this case, this is the same district
court that heard Lee National Corporation v. Segur, 281 F. Supp. 851 (E.D.
Pa. 1968).
54. Colby v. Klune, 178 F.2d 872 (2d Cir. 1949).

55. Lockheed v. Rathman, 106 F. Supp. 810 (S.D. Cal. 1952).
56. Lockheed v. Campbell, 110 F. Supp. 282 (S.D. Cal. 1953). The defendant also served as an assistant treasurer.
57. Lee National Corporation v. Segur, 281 F. Supp. 851 (E.D. Pa. 1968).
The court never specifically spelled out what position defendant held with
issuer's subsidiary.
58. 57 F.R.D. 481 (S.D.N.Y. 1973). The decision was rendered on Jan.
8.
59. Id. at 483. The total "profit" of defendant was $83,490.80, which was
calculated on total amount received in the sale of shares in the relevant
time period minus the original cost of purchase.
60. Id.

fense that he was not an officer as defined in 16(b) was substantial
enough to permit a settlement which allowed him to escape with
28% of his profit.0 1
The court stated that on first impression it would seem that the
defendant should not be able to deny he was an officer under 16(b)
in light of the fact that he had consistently characterized himself
as a corporate officer in reports filed with the SEC.02 Despite the
fact that even under his own description he was vice-president,
the defendant contended that he would not be foreclosed from
arguing at trial that his position was merely titular. Goldman
claimed that the title of vice-president was deceiving because he
had no policy making functions or access to inside information. The
SEC responded to this contention with a rather unique argument
that if a "person wishes to enjoy the prestige of an office, he shares
the responsibilities under section 16."13
The court considered the Commission's and the defendant's contentions and sought to resolve the matter by turning to the language of Colby.6 4 It noted:

61. Id. at 486. "[The question for this Court is not whether Goldman

was or was not a corporate officer, but whether this argument is substantial
and justifies some discount from maximum recovery."
62. Id. at 485. "[Ilt is not disputed that Goldman submitted several

Form 4's, the reporting document required by § 16(a), 15 U.S.C. § 78p (a),

describing himself as a Vice-President of Banner." Because he did file
Form 4, the SEC could only pursue the matter in an amicus brief and not
as a plaintiff itself. Had Goldman failed to file Form 4, reporting any
transaction in the past month, the SEC could have sought injunctive relief.
SEC v. Golconda Mining Co., 297 F. Supp. 125 (S.D.N.Y. 1968); SEC v. Shattuck Denn Mining Corp., CCH 1967-69 FED. SEc. L. REP. ff 92,117 (S.D.N.Y.
1968). Furthermore, failure to file not only tolls the statute of limitations,
but also exposes the insider to criminal prosecution. United States v.
Guterma, 281 F.2d 742 (2d Cir. 1960), cert. denied, 364 U.S. 871 (1960).
63. 57 F.R.D. at 485. The court went on to say that the Second Circuit had
never adopted such a position. See also First of Michigan Corporation, 181

SEC. REG. AwD L. REP. at c-2 (1972) no-action letter. A Comrany that
had 22 employees entitled "Assistant Vice-President" inquired of the SEC
whether they must register for purposes of section 16 (a) even though "these
individuals are not empowered to make and do not participate in the making of policy decisions for the firm." (letter of inquiry, 9/5/72). The Commission responded: "The term 'officer' as defined in Rule 3b-2 . . . is interpreted by this Division to include any person who bears the title VicePresident, as well as any person who performs in the capacity of an officer,
regardless of his title. Accordingly, the 22 Assistant Vice-Presidents must
comply with the requirements of section 16(a), unless their titles are
changed to indicate that they are not officers of the company." (reply
memorandum of 11/7/72) (emphasis added).
64. The judge in Schimmel seems to have misread the facts of Colby
because at 485 he states "[TIhe District Court granted summary judgment
for plaintiff, but the Second Circuit reversed because the defendant's alle-

gation that he was not in fact an officer raised material questions of fact."
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[T]here remains much room for inquiring into the facts at a trial.
For the functions of a "vice-president" or "comptroller" are not so
well settled as to be self-evident, and there is need for evidence
concerning those functions. Under that Rule as we interpret it, it
does not matter whether or how the by-laws of this particular company defines the duties of such officers. The question is what this
particular employee was called upon to do in this particular combetween his authorized activities and those
pany, i.e. the relation
of this corporation.0 5

The court went on to say that the SEC was being inconsistent
because in the present case it proposed one guideline to be used
06
In light of the
with 3b-2, while in Colby it suggested another.
Colby decision and the SEC's interpretation of 3b-2 in that case,
the court in Schimmel held that:
[N]either the Second Circuit nor the SEC were willing to assume
Rule 3b-2 foreclosed the defendant from arguing that, although
given the title of an officer, he did not perform the policy making
functions or have access to inside information which characterize
Neither the parties' rean "officer" for purposes of § 16(b) ....
search nor my own discovered any decision in this Circuit which
holds Rule 3b-2 valid or invalid or interprets it further than Colby
Thus, defendant Goldman would be free at trial
v. Klune ....
to raise the issue of whether he was an insider despite the Form
4 reports and Rule 3b-2.67
The district court which initially dealt with the Colby case stated "[T]hese
are cross motions for summary judgment," 83 F. Supp. at 159, and it ruled
that "Plaintiff's cross-motion is denied and defendant's granted," 83 F.
Supp. at 162. The court of appeals decision, 178 F.2d at 872, summarized
the results of the lower court's decision as "The District Court of the Southern District of New York, 83 F. Supp. 159, rendered a summary judgment
for the defendants, and the plaintiff appealed." Thus it would appear that
it was the defendant who received a summary judgment which was reversed when the plaintiff appealed the district court's decision that defendant production manager was not an officer for the purposes of 16 (b).
What is also unusual is that two other cases in 1973 interpreted the Colby
facts in the same manner. Selas Corroration of America v. Voogd, 365 F.
Supp. 1268, 1270 (E.D. Pa. 1973), stated "In this case [Colby], the court
reversed the district court's granting of a summary judgment for the plaintiff." Morales v. Holiday Inns, 366 F. Supp. 760, 762 (S.D.N.Y. 1973) said
that the district court in Colby "[R]eversed a summary judgment against
an officer [defendant]."

65. 57 F.R.D. at 485-86, citing Colby v. Klune, 178 F.2d 872.
66. Id. at 486:
Interestingly, the SEC did not argue in Colby v. Klune, as it does
here, that Rule 3b-2 forecloses any inquiry into what the defendant
did but rather argued: [Ilt is significant that the employee has
or has not "responsibility for the policy of at least a substantial segment of the corporation's affairs" and participates in "executive
councils of the corporation as an officer"..
67. Id. at 486.

Thus, the Schimmel court seems to have relegated 3b-2 to a judis The
cial limbo-neither confirming it nor rejecting it.6
reasoning
behind this effort appears to have been to enable the court to escape
the emphatic language of 3b-2 describing a vice-president as an
officer. Instead, the Schimmel ruling focuses on the Colby court's
viewpoint which downplays the significance of an employee having
a certain title and asks whether the executive performs policy
making functions or has access to inside information. 9
Several months after the Schimmel result, the Eastern District
Court of Pennsylvania wrestled with the 16(b) officer issue in Selas
Corporation of America v. Voogd. 70 The defendant had exercised an option and sold it within a six-month span. At all
times relevant to the purchase and sale in question, the defendant
had been executive vice-president of international operations of
Selas Corporation. 71 Despite the fact that "executive vice-president" appeared to be within the scope of 3b-2, Voogd denied that he
was an officer for 16 (b) purposes. He asserted that he was a mere
figurehead, having no say in the company's afafirs and having no
access to inside information.72 The plaintiff corporation moved for
a summary judgment, alleging that the facts left no possible doubt
that the defendant was an officer under 16 (b).
Thus, the Selas court was faced with a Schimmel type situationa corporate vice-president claiming that 3b-2 did not create a conclusive presumption that an enumerated officer was automatically
an insider under the terms of 16(b). Like the Schimmel court had
done, the judge in Selas turned to the language of Colby. He noted
that Colby left the status of 3b-2 unclear.73 The judge then went
on to the Schimmel case itself which he interpreted as also casting
68. The court did mention Lockheed Aircraft Corp. v. Campbell, 110 F.

Supp. 282 (S.D. Cal. 1953), and Lockheed Aircraft Corp. v. Rathman, 106
F. Supp. 810 (S.D. Cal. 1952), both of which had held 3b-2 valid. However,
it distinguished these cases from the present matter when it ruled "[T] hese
holdings are of little precedential value because the issue in each case was
whether an assistant treasurer, a position not included in the Rule's definition of 'officer,' was an insider for the purposes of § 16 (b)." 57 F.R.D. at
486.
69. Id. at 487: "In conclusion, I find that the settlement is fair and reasonable. It represents approximately 72% of the maximum recovery sought
by the plaintiff. When balanced against the substantial hazards and additional expenses of a trial, it appears to be a fair settlement .... His

...defense is also substantial and, if successful, would defeat any recovery
by the corporation."
70. 365 F. Supp. 1268 (E.D. Pa. 1973). The decision was rendered on Sept.
5th. See note 53, supra.
71. Id. at 1270.
72. Id.

73. Id. "The validity and effect of 3b-2 has not been clearly established."
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doubt on the role of 3b-2.74 Finally, the Selas court focused on
75
an eastern district of Virginia case, Gold v. Scurlock, which it
cited with approval. "Being a corporate officer without portfolio
does not per se make him an 'insider' as contemplated in 16(b).1176
The court apparently reasoned that these three cases had cast
sufficient doubt on rule 3b-2 being the sole determinant of 16 (b)
status that a corporation's vice-president was not to be precluded
from asserting at trial that he was outside of the rule. Nevertheless, the court granted the plaintiff's motion for summary judgment. The court noted:
The affidavits and exhibits submitted by the plaintiff ... clearly
indicate that Voogd was of the more active members of the executive committee, and that he was the chief operating officer of the
most important section of plaintiff's business which, at that time,
was producing most of the profits for Selas. The minutes of the
executive committee meetings . . show that defendant Voogd had
intimate knowledge of the innerworkings of Selas, that he had a
substantial voice in policy of the corporation, and in fact, functioned
as a corporate officer .... [I]t cannot be said that he did not have
to inside information as contemplated by § 16(b) of the
access
Act.7 7
In reaching its decison, the Selas court appears to have utilized
78
This is not
the "confidential information" test outlined in Colby.
refextensive
had
made
court
the
because
surprising,
particularly
the
is
that
is
interesting
what
However,
case.
Colby
erence to the
in
proposed
had
SEC
the
court in Selas also used the guidelines
79
3b-2.
interpreting
in
used
be
to
Colby
Perhaps if Voogd had emulated the approach of Goldman, his
counterpart in Schimmel, he might have been more successful.
When a 16 (b) loss seemed likely, Goldman entered into a compromise with his company whereby he agreed to give them 72% of his
profits. Only when the SEC objected to the settlement did the matter get before the court. This is the distinguishing point between
74. Id. at 1271.
75. 324 F. Supp. 1211, 1215 (E.D. Va. 1971). The Fourth Circuit Court
of Appeals accepted the case on appeal. It affirmed the district court's result in part but reversed the finding of liability on several defendants. See
notes 89-105, infra.
76. 365 F. Supp. at 1271.
77. Id.
78. 178 F.2d at 873. Note in particular the phraseology of the last sentence of the above quote.
79. See notes 26 and 66, supra.

the two cases. In Schimmel the court was asked to rule on the legitimacy of a settlement, and in the Selas case the court had to rule as
to whether a vice-president was an officer under 16 (b). Because it
was considering the worthiness of a settlement, the Schimmel court
never inquired into Goldman's possible status as an officer. Instead,
it focused on the question of whether it was possible for an employee
who clearly fell within rule 3b-2 to escape the rigors of 16 (b).
The Schimmel court held that 3b-2 does not create a conclusive presumption that a vice-president was an officer and that Goldman
would be free to litigate the issue in a trial. After considering the
potential court costs saved by the compromise, the court approved
the settlement-and with it the defendant's retention of 28% of his
profit.8 0
After the SeZas decision, the focus again returned to the southern
district of New York, in Morales v. Holiday Inns."' The facts in
Morales were virtually identical to those in Schimmel, especially
those involving the corporate position and the compromise settlement. The only significant difference was in the result.
The essential elements of this case were that the defendant, Jones,
was a vice-president of Holiday Inns, in charge of Inn operations.
There was no dispute that he had bought and sold his company's
stock within the prohibited time period. When a shareholder
threatened to bring a derivative suit on the corporation's behalf
against the defendant, he entered into a compromise settlement
with the company. Under the terms of this agreement, Jones
retained some 30% of his profits, the remainder going to the corpora82
tion.
The shareholder objected to the settlement and filed suit. He
felt that there was no reason for a compromise under the present
facts and that 100% compensation was due Holiday Inns. Jones, in
rebuttal, claimed that 16 (b) did not apply since he was not an officer, despite the fact that he was listed as vice-president in the corporation's records and SEC filings.8 3
80. See notes 61 and 69, supra.
81. 366 F. Supp. 760 (S.D.N.Y. 1973). The decision was rendered on Nov.
12th.
82. Although the court in this case did not rely on the Schimmel decision,
it would appear that the defendant borrowed quite liberally from it. In
Schimmel, the defendant-corporation split was 28%-72%. In this case it

was 30%-70%. Also, after considering Jones' defense in the present case

(see text accompanying note 83, infra), it is apparent that the defendant
also hoped for a Schimmel result.
83. 366 F. Supp. at 762. The language defendant uses in the present case
is virtually the same as Goldman's in the Schimmel decision. See 57 F.R.D.
at 485.

[VOL. 12: 378, 1975]

Comments
SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW

Prior to rendering its decision, the court summarized the issue
before it:
As in any settlement, a fair compromise is one that does not assume
certain victory or certain defeat.

Of course, if the Court believes

that the legal issue tendered is colorably contrived to mask the real
intention of the parties unduly to favor the officer against his corporation, or if there is simply no merit to the defense, equity will
not give sanction to the settlement. The issue is whether Jones'
contention that he was not an officer for Section 16(b) purposes
was substantial enough8 4not for victory, but for getting a discount
of 30% on a settlement.
Moving on to other matters, the judge noted that the Second Circuit's Colby decision put a "gloss" on the meaning of "officers"
under 3b-2 for 16 (b) purposes and that rule 3b-2 alone was not
sufficient to establish officer status. The court then turned to
Colby and its "access to confidential information" test,8 5 and held
that Jones had "access to information concerning both the financial
and operational performance of the Company-owned inns which
comprised twenty percent of all the Holiday Inns."""
In granting the plaintiff's motion for a summary judgment, the
court ruled that there was little doubt that Jones' position enabled
him to acquire important information relating to the business of
the company and that such information would be beneficial in
market transactions. The court further added that "[t]his 'defense,' aside from Rule 3b-2, could not be sustained under Colby
87
v. Klune, . . . Jones' title was not honorific."
The district court in Morales v. Holiday Inns apparently sensed
that the Schimmel ruling permitted a creative defendant who
violated the terms of 16(b) to enter into a settlement with the company and salvage some of his profits. The Morales court felt that
such a maneuver was not within the spirit of 16(b). To prevent
this occurrence the court did not turn to 3b-2 for its precedent but
rather placed its reliance in Colby's "confidential information"
84. 366 F. Supp. at 762.

85. Id. at 762-63:

The test required in Colby v. Klune .

.

. is that "an officer" under

16(b) be "a corporate employee performing important executive
duties of such character that he would be likely, in discharging
these duties, to obtain confidential information about the company's
affairs that would aid him if he engaged in personal market transactions .

...

86. Id. at 763.
87. Id.

"

test. 8 Thus for 16 (b) officer purposes, in the prestigious southern
district of New York, Colby still commands.
The Schimmel, Selas, and Morales decisions can more or less be
viewed as belonging to the same colony. Although the facts and
results of each case were varied, the same basic theme is woven
through the three-rule 3b-2 is not a conclusive determinant of
16(b) officer status. The three cases place their faith in Colby's
"access to confidential information" standard, as applied to the facts
of the particular case. Essentially, all three decisions represent a
very subjective approach to the 16 (b) officer issue.
A 1973 case that seems to depart from the Schimmel, Selas, and
Morales mold is the Fourth Circuit's decision in Gold v. Sloan.8 9
The case was appealed to the court by a group of defendants 0 who
felt that the district court's 9' approach to a 16(b) issue was too
expansive.
Essentially, the issue before the court of appeals was whether
two officers of a newly merged company who had engaged in shortswing trading could avoid the grasp of 16(b). At the district court
level, defendant Rumbel had avoided liability because the court felt
that he performed minor duties that did not accurately reflect his
title as vice-president. Rumbel, it reasoned, was not bound by
88. See note 85, supra.
89. 486 F.2d 340 (4th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, Gold v. Scurlock, 43
U.S.L.W. 3212 (Oct. 15, 1974). This case should be approached with caution.
Unlike the other 1973 16(b) officer decisions Gold v. Sloan involved a merger situation. In reaching its conclusion the majority placed great emphasis
on Kern County Land Co v. Occidental Petroleum Corp., 411 U.S. 582
(1972). This case is of particular significance because the defendant was
able to avoid 16(b) liability although it was a 10% shareholder. The Supreme Court felt that the unusual facts involved in the Kern County case
(a merger-like situation) permitted the use of a "subjective test." The
Fourth Circuit apparently borrowed this subjective approach and applied
it to the officers in the present case who otherwise appeared to be within
the scope of 16 (b).
90. The issue before the court of appeals was much broader than 16(b)
officer status. There were questions involving mergers, purchase and sale,
directors' abuse of inside information, as well as 16 (b) officers. For the
purposes of this article we will only concern ourselves with the defendants
Keith Rumbel and Glen Sloane. Rumbel was a senior vice-president of the
pre-merger company. Pursuant to the merger, he became senior vice-president of a division of the acquiring company. Rumbel held this position
when he engaged in short-swing trading. Sloane likewise was a vice-president of the pre-merger company. Upon the merger he became a vice-president of a subsidiary of the purchasing parent company, and several months
later he became vice-president of the parent company itself. For a general
summary of the Gold v. Sloan case see Comment, Securities Exchange Act
Section 16(b): Fourth Circuit Harvests Some Kernals of Gold, 42 FoWHAM
L. REv. 852 (1974).
91. Gold v. Scurlock, 324 F. Supp. 1211 (E.D. Va. 1971).
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were "mere staff functions-routine ad16(b) because his duties
'92
ministrative chores.
The Fourth Circuit affirmed the lower court's judgment that
Rumbel was not within the scope of 16(b).

It interpreted the

district court's decision to be based on the premise that the defendant never had any oportunity to avail himself of inside information.

Further, the appellate court noted that the district court had held
that Rumbel's title was merely "titular" and thus it was ineffective

to clothe him with the reality of an officer. 93 Interestingly, the
lower court never used any of the phraseology which the circuit
court associated with its Gold v. Scurlock decision. Perhaps the
Fourth Circuit felt that the district court's reasoning in finding no
officer status for Rumbel was too abstract. Whatever the reason,
the court of appeals instead chose a Colby-like "access to confidential information" test when it affirmed Rumbel's acquittal. 94
Circuit Judge Winter, concurring in part and dissenting in part,
felt that both the majority and the district court had approached
Rumbel's officer status in an awkward manner. He thought that
although Rumbel was a senior vice-president, he could avoid 16(b)
liability, but not for the reasons put forth by the majority. Instead,
Justice Winter focused on the wording of 3b-2 95 that the vicepresident must be an officer of the "issuer." He noted:
There is a semantic difference between "vice-president of the issuer," the obvious reading of the rule, and "vice-president of a division of the issuer." That this difference may be important is sug-

gested by the rule that an officer of a subsidiary of the issuer is not
an officer of the issuer, unless it is proven that he actually performs
the function of an officer for the parent .... I do not think it

sound to include, within the categories of 'officers' specifically
X-3b-2, a person beyond the literal scope of
enumerated in Rule
9
those categories. 6
92. Id. at 1215.

93. Gold v. Sloan, 486 F.2d 340 (4th Cir. 1973).

94. The district court never cited any rule or case in holding that Rumbel
was not an officer under 16(b). The Fourth Circuit in a footnote cited
Colby when it affirmed the lower court's decision. 486 F.2d at 351 n.24.

95. Winter, in his opinion, gave the first judicial affirmation of the valid-

ity of Rule 3b-2 since the decision in Lee National Corp. v. Segur, 281 F.
Supp. 851 (E.D. Pa. 1968). The Schimmel, Selas, and Morales cases all left
the status of 3b-2 unclear. The majority of the Fourth Circuit also seemed
to have ignored the rule. Winters noted "The rule has been held to be a
valid exercise of the S.E.C.'s power under § 3(b), 15 U.S.C.A. § 78c(b)
(1971), to define 'technical, trade, and accounting terms'." 486 F.2d at 358.
He cited both of the Lockheed cases as authority for holding 3b-2 valid.
96. 486 F.2d at 358 (Winter, J., concurring and dissenting).

Thus, while the court of appeals held flumbel not liable because
of some vague Colby-like standard, Winter instead utilized the Lee
National court's approach and resolved the problem by again using
3b-2 as the measuring rod. The yes-no approach of Winter appears
to eliminate the legal contortions required by the Fourth Circuit's
subjective test.
The facts involving defendant Sloane were more complicated.
After the merger agreement, he was elected a vice-president of the
parent corporation's subsidiary.9 7 On December 4, 1967, the merger
became effective. It was on this date, while still an officer of the
subsidiary, that he exercised an option in the parent company's
stock. He became vice-president of the parent company on April
26, 1968. On May 8, 1968, Sloane sold the shares. Thus, the only
defense available to the defendant was that he was not a 16(b)
officer because his market activities were obviously within a six
month period.
While the district court had little difficulty in finding Rumbel
not liable, it felt otherwise about Sloane. The lower court's decision
was overturned by the court of appeals, because the majority
decided that Sloane was merely a member of the lower management
hierarchy in spite of his office. 98 The Fourth Circuit ruled that
the district court's record contained no evidence to indicate that
Sloane had any access to inside information which could serve as
a vehicle for speculative abuse. Thus, it would appear that the
majority was using the Colby standard in determining 16(b) officer
liability.
Once again, Justice Winter questioned the validity of the majority's approach to officer status. He revealed his feelings on the
matter when he stated:
I do not believe Sloane's participation in the events that transpired
and his access to inside information during the pre-merger period
is determinative. Rather, I would look to the first six months of
the post-merger period. 99

Justice Winter noted that when Sloane purchased'0 0 the parent
company's stock he was still an officer of the subsidiary. The subsequent sale took place after the defendant had become an officer
97. Had he remained on as vice-president of the subsidiary, he probably
would not have been liable under the test proposed by Winter. See text
accompanying note 96, supra.
98. 486 F.2d at 351.
99. Id. at 359 (Winter, J., concurring and dissenting).
100. The "purchase" for the purposes of this case occurred when Sloane
exchanged his present stock holdings for stock in the parent corporation
with which his old company had merged.
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in the parent corporation. Using rule 3b-2 as a guide, Winter
observed that the defendant had not been a 16(b) officer at the
time of the merger, but only when he sold. 1 1 In a complex explanation, he staggered to the conclusion that Sloane probably was
not liable. 10 2 Winter suggested that an inquiry should be made
as to whether or not during the post-merger period the defendant was in a position to obtain and use inside information
in planning a disposition of the parent company's stock.10 3 His final
recommendation was to remand the Sloane matter back to the district court for further exploration of the situation. 04
In resolving Rumbel's dilemma as an officer of a subsidiary, Winter used a concise and logical approach. Unfortunately, his resolution of the Sloane question was not nearly so masterful. Instead, he
offered a confusing parade of tests'0 5 that can only serve to leave
the lower courts in total disarray when dealing with the postmerger status of an officer under 16(b). The majority's use of
Colby's "access to inside information"'0 6 test would seem to be a
better guide than the awkward proposal of Winter. Although
Colby is a subjectively difficult standard, it at least has some precedential background.
CONCLUSION
Clarification of the officer issue is urgently needed, because in
a fluctuating stock market, short-swing trading is particularly
attractive. Those who are clearly leaders of their corporations
should not be permitted to avoid 16(b) liability by utilizing Colby's
subjective test with its higher standard of proof. Nor should they
101. 486 F.2d at 359.
102. Id.
103. Id. at 356. At 353-356 Winter explains his basic overall approach
to the problem. Interestingly, in this opening section he cites Kern County
Land Co. v. Occidental Petroleum Corp., 411 U.S. 582 (1972) with approval.
Apparently this is the standard Winter wanted to apply to Sloan.
104. Id. at 359:
As to Sloane, I would therefore remand to the district court for
further exploration of whether, prior to April 26, 1967-the date of
his election as an officer of Susquehanna--Sloane performed any
functions for Susquehanna corresponding to those of any of the categories of officers enumerated in Rule X-3b-2. If the district court
finds that he did, judgment should go against him; but if he did
not, he should be exonerated.
105. See notes 102-103, supra.
106. See note 89, supra.

be able to deny their officer role and enter into compromises which
allow them to retain a portion of their profits. At the same time
however, the insignificant borderline officer should receive more
guidance as to his status than Colby provides. If he involves himself in the market, he risks either a 16(b) suit or the prospect of
being forced to hold a lackluster stock for the required period of
time.
So far, the district courts and courts of appeal have failed to resolve the 16 (b) officer dilemma. Furthermore, it appears unlikely
that a sufficiently broad fact situation could ever be presented
which would afford the Supreme Court with the opportunity to
render a comprehensive definition. Thus, the final resolution of
this quandary will emerge only when Congress moves against the
tide of the judiciary's increasingly subjective approach and provides
a long needed definitive standard upon which the business community can rely.
A. JomH MuPIHY

